Appendix A
Deriving Equation (2): The corrective gasoline tax. The optimal tax is derived using a standard two-step procedure. First, we solve the household optimization problem in equation (1) above, where externalities, and government variables, are taken as given. This yields the first order conditions:
The second step is to totally differentiate the household's indirect utility function, which is simply equivalent to the expression in (1), with respect to the gasoline tax. In this step, economy-wide changes in externalities and the government transfer are taken into account.
Using the first order conditions in (A1) to eliminate terms in
, and G dt dX / , the total differential is given by:
Thus, the fraction of the reduction in gasoline use that is due to reduced mileage is Deriving Equation (4): Welfare gains from tax reform. Expression (A2) gives the welfare gain from an incremental increase in the gasoline tax. Dividing by λ to express in monetary terms, and substituting from (A3) and (2b), gives:
Using the definitions of
Integrating over the tax rise gives the total welfare gain in equation (4) above.
Deriving Equation (6): The corrective diesel tax.
The household optimization in equation (5) yields the first order conditions:
And the optimization over fuel intensity by producers (i.e., the minimization of per unit trucking costs in (5c)) yields:
Differentiating the household's indirect utility function (equivalent to the expression in (5a)), accounting for changes in externalities, and using (A9) to eliminate terms in 
The impact of the fuel tax on the price of the trucked good is, from differentiating (5c) and substituting (A10):
Substituting (A12), (A13) and (5b) in (A11), and equating to zero, gives the corrective diesel tax formula defined in (6a) and (6b) above. Viscusi and Aldy (2003) and Miller (1997) estimate the VSL/income elasticity at about 0.5 and unity respectively. Alan Krupnick, an expert on the issue, recommended we use a range of 0.5 to 1.0 (personal communication, November 2008). However, pending additional studies, Hammitt and Robinson (2011) suggest using a range of 1.0 to 1.5 to extrapolate VSL values for middle and low income countries. This is based on some recent studies suggesting the VSL/income elasticity might be greater than unity (e.g., Hammitt et al., 2000; Cropper and Sahin, 2009 ). Our lower bound value is more in line with a local, stated preference study, after updating .
is better represented by a concave (log-linear) rather than linear function (Pope et al., 2004 (Pope et al., , 2006 .
In 
α and θ are parameters and T f is time per mile when traffic is free flowing. A typical value for the exponent θ is 2.55.0 (Small, 1992: 70-71) . With α = 0.15 and θ = 4.0, equation (C2) is the Bureau of Public Roads formula, which is widely used in traffic engineering models. There are various other dimensions to accident costs that we include but, at least for Chile, these costs are small relative to those from external fatalities. Therefore, the detailed assumptions made below are not especially important.
There were 6,515, 4,400 and 36,020 serious, less-serious, and light injuries in policereported road accidents in 2006. 12 These injuries are not broken out according to pedestrian/cyclists and vehicle occupants, though we would expect pedestrians to account for a much smaller share of these nonfatal injuries than their share in fatalities, given that a car/pedestrian collision is far more likely to cause a fatality than a car/car collision. We assume that 32 percent of non-fatal injuries are external (compared with 65 percent for fatalities).
We value the personal suffering costs from nonfatal injuries using two sources. First, we take the personal cost of suffering from a serious, less-serious, and light injury from the corresponding figure for disabling, evident, and possible injuries in Parry (2004) , Table 2 Adding up, and monetizing, external non-fatal injuries with these alternative personal cost assumptions gives an additional external cost of $0.18 billion. Splitting the difference between the two estimates gives our preferred external cost of $0.14 billion.
We assume that 85 percent of medical costs for all non-fatal injuries (including injuries in single-vehicle collisions, etc.) are external (they are largely borne by third parties, particularly government medical services). Again, we obtain the total external cost from valuing 85 percent of non-fatal injuries using the medical costs implied by Parry (2004) and by Rizzi (2008b) (in each case medical costs per injury are one-quarter of personal injury costs) and split the difference. This produces an additional external cost of $0.09 billion.
Finally, we assume that 50 percent of property damage costs (from all accidents) are external that is borne by insurance companies, rather than individuals (through deductibles, non-insured accidents, elevated premiums following a claim, etc.). Data on traffic accidents involving property damage only (and no injuries) is unavailable: based on Parry (2004, table 2), we assume the number of these accidents is the same as those involving light injuries.
Property damages per accident class are also obtained from Parry (2004, Instances of health effect
